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NOTES
Fairness in Freezeout Transactions:
Observations on Coping with Going
Private Problems
INTRODUCTION
An area of expanding importance in corporate law in-
volves attempts by state and federal entities to deal with the
problem of corporate "freezeouts," especially in the context of
a "going private" transaction.' Generally, a corporate freeze-
out refers to purposeful activity on the part of some owners of
a business enterprise aimed at eliminating other owners or
participants.2 A "going private" transaction is a species of
freezeout3 that involves a particular set of circumstances,
which have been described as follows:
The essence of a freezeout [in the going private context] is
the displacement of public investors by those who own a
controlling block of stock of a corporation, whether individ-
uals or a parent company, for cash or senior securities. The
public investors are thus required to give up their equity in
the enterprise, while the controllers retain theirs. Freezeouts
most commonly take the form of a merger of a corporation
into its existing parent or into a shell corporation newly
formed for the purpose by those who control the merged
entity."
I As noted in F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS at iii
(Supp. 1979): "Since the publication of this treatise in 1975, the volume of litigation
grounded on minority shareholder oppression-actual, fancied or fabricated-has
grown enormously."
2 Id. at 1 (1975).
3 One problem with discussing going private transactions as a species of freeze-
out is that a number of cases and commentaries use the terms interchangeably. As
will become apparent shortly, however, there are several different types of freezeouts,
of which going private is but one. Further discussion of this point is contained at
notes 22-47 infra and accompanying text.
' Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeze-outs, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1357 (1978). As noted in Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stock-
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terest for two reasons. First, it often appears that the corpora-
tion is taking unfair advantage of certain market fluctuations."
Second, such transactions are perceived as harmful to the
public shareholders who are eliminated.' As a result, both
state and federal entities have become involved in an effort to
obtain some degree of control over going private transactions.
In the state law context, Delaware took the lead in con-
trolling going private mergers with two 1977 decisions by its
supreme court: Singer v. Magnavox Co. 7 and Tanzer v. Inter-
national General Industries, Inc.8 Those cases held that it
holder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964), a freezeout or going
private transaction "has come to imply a purpose to force a liquidation or sale of
stockholder's shares," and not just any action of those in control of the corporation
which results in the termination of the shareholder's interest in the corporation.
I It is noted at 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60090-91 (1977) that a number of the going
private transactions which occurred during the depressed stock market of 1974 in-
volved corporations which only recently had offered securities to the public for the
first time. This knowledge leads to the conclusion that such corporations, or the con-
trolling interests therein, took advantage of the high securities prices of the 1960's
market to obtain the benefits of public financing, only to go private again in the de-
pressed market of the 1970's. In essence, the corporation sold when the market price
was unusually high and then forced the public to sell back when the price became
depressed. See, e.g., Note, Delaware Reexamines its Merger Laws: New Protection
for Minority Shareholders?, 6 HoFSmA L. REV. 973, 978 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Rights of Minority Shareholders]; Note, Corporate Freezeouts: A New Limitation
Imposed by the "Entire Fairness" Standard, 1978 ILL. L.F. 686, 690-91 [hereinafter
cited as Corporate Freezeouts]; Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders from
Freezeouts Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1421, 1429-34 (1976).
6 The following harmful effects are outlined by the commentators: 1) the minor-
ity's equity participation in the enterprise is ended at the time and under terms cho-
sen by the majority; 2) any benefits which may arise inure to the benefit of the major-
ity alone; 3) the minority is put to the risk of finding a new investment which is
comparable to that surrendered; and 4) the minority stockholder is forced to face the
income tax consequences of liquidation at a time which is not of his choosing. See,
e.g., Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1023-25 (1975); Note,
The Fiduciary Duty of Majority Shareholders in Freezeout Mergers: A Suggested
Approach, 47 FORDHAm L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Freezeout
Mergers]; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 694-99; Comment, Going Private-
Juggling Shareholder Protection with Corporate Flexibility: Will the States Drop
the Ball?, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 797, 801-05.
Perhaps the most harmful effect of going private transactions is the potential loss
of investor confidence in the capital markets. 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60091 (1977); Com-
ment, supra note 6, at 804.
7 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
1 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
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was a breach of fiduciary duty for the majority stockholders to
approve a merger for the sole purpose of freezing out the mi-
nority interests.' The court also held that a complaint alleging
such a singular purpose would justify judicial scrutiny to de-
termine the "entire fairness" of the transaction.10 More re-
cently, the Delaware Supreme Court extended its Singer-
Tanzer rulings to cover short form mergers under the Dela-
ware corporation statute.11 This extension was accomplished
in Roland International Corp. v. Najjar,12 a decision which
illuminated the underlying considerations of Singer and
Tanzer.
On the federal side, the watershed opinion was delivered
by the Supreme Court in 1977, when it decided Santa Fe In-
dustries, Inc. v. Green.'3 In reversing a decision of the Second
Circuit,"' the Court ruled that section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act15 and rule 10b-5'0 promulgated thereunder had
very limited applicability to freezeout situations. As a result,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated
new rules17 which will provide the basis for future federal in-
' 380 A.2d at 978; 379 A.2d at 1123. Both cases, however, did suggest that if a
legitimate business purpose existed for the merger, then that part of the test would
be satisfied.
10 380 A.2d at 980; 379 A.2d at 1125.
1 The Delaware short form merger statute is contained in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 253 (1974). A short form merger is a statutory procedure which allows a parent
corporation and its subsidiary to merge pursuant to certain shortened procedures. For
example, unlike the long form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp.
1978), the short form merger does not require approval by the stockholders of the
subsidiary corporation. The short form merger does require, however, that the parent
own a certain minimum percentage of the stock of the subsidiary (90% in Delaware).
11 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
12 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
4 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977).
Is 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
16 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979).
27 44 Fed. Reg. 46741 (1979), rule 13-3 (to be codified in 17 CFR § 240.13e-3).
The SEC has also approved a schedule for use in meeting the rule 13e-3 disclosure
requirements. 44 Fed. Reg. 46743 (1979), schedule 13e-3 (to be codified in 17 CFR §
240.13e-100).
It is also noteworthy that the SEC has promulgated a new rule and schedule
regarding tender offers by certain issuers which might have an impact in the going
private area. 44 Fed. Reg. 49410 (1979), rule 13e-4 (to be codified in 17 CFR §
240.13e-4); 44 Fed. Reg. 49412 (1979), schedule 13e-4 (to be codified in 17 CFR §
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volvement in going private transactions.
The purpose of this Note is to discuss these most recent
developments concerning going private types of freezeout
transactions. The primary focus will be on the particular char-
acteristics of the going private transaction-particularly, the
going private mergers-as distinguished from freezeout trans-
actions in other factual milieux. Accordingly, the critical anal-
ysis which follows will involve several distinct steps. First, the
various factual contexts in which freezeouts occur will be set
out. This discussion will provide a background against which
the going private transaction can be more fully understood.1
Second, the historical impetus behind the treatment of going
private mergers will be outlined.1 9 An analysis of the Singer-
Tanzer state law approach, in terms of both judicial and legis-
Iative precedent, will follow.20 This analysis will include an ex-
amination of the posture of public shareholders in a going
private transaction. Finally, there will be a general discussion
of the new federal rule and the types of transactions it
covers.
2 1
I. FACTUAL VARIATIONS OF FREEZEOUT TRANSACTIONS
A discussion of the various contexts in which freezeouts
occur is essential in understanding the unique issues raised by
going private mergers and in determining the applicability of
legal standards to such mergers. 22 Basically, there are three
240.13e-1010.
I8 See notes 22-47 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of these factual
patterns.
19 See notes 74-94 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical
setting of going private mergers.
so See notes 95-221 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the state law
standards of fiduciary duty, bona fide (or business) purposes and intrinsic fairness.
1 See notes 222-58 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of rule 13e-3 in
terms of both the general approach of the SEC in this area and the spectrum of
transactions covered by the new federal rule.
22 In Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, and Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out
Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487 (1976), the authors suggest that
familiarity with the factual contexts in which freezeouts occur is essential for deter-
mining the degree of scrutiny which courts of equity should apply to the transaction.
These authors divide freezeout transactions into three categories: 1) tender offers fol-
lowed by mergers with an outsider of the corporation; 2) mergers between a parent
[Vol. 69
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factual considerations which serve to shape the analysis of a
given freezeout transaction. The first is whether the freezeout
involves closely-held (as opposed to publicly-owned) corpora-
tions. The second concerns the mechanism by which the mi-
nority shareholders are eliminated. The last is whether the
freezeout is precipitated by corporate insiders or outsiders.
A. Close Corporations Versus Public Corporations
It almost goes without saying that a going private trans-
action can occur only in a publicly-owned corporation, where
there are public shareholders to force out.2" A close corpora-
tion is, by definition, already private.2 There may be, how-
ever, a freezeout in a closely-held corporation; this can occur
whenever certain shareholders are forced out of the enter-
prise.
A fundamental distinction between privately- and pub-
licly-held corporations is the typical role played by the stock-
holder in each type of enterprise. In a close corporation, many
stockholders, even those with only a minority interest in the
business, participate in a number of capacities. Such a stock-
holder may have not only an investment interest in the corpo-
ration qua stockholder, but important "subsidiary" relation-
ships to the business as well, such as full time employment.2
In a close corporation, it is conceivable that this subsidiary
relationship may be financially more rewarding than the ac-
tual stock ownership, and its loss may be more devastating
than loss of the investment interest.26
On the other hand, the public investor in a public corpo-
ration typically has only a stockholder relationship to the cor-
poration. Generally, his interest is an investment interest
only, and he has no real voice in the manner in which the
corporation and its subsidiary; and 3) mergers between a corporation and a sham
corporation created for the purpose of the freezeout. The categories call for ascending
degrees of judicial scrutiny. See notes 174-82 infra and accompanying text for a more
extensive discussion of this approach.
23 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 361-65 (1975).
4 Id. at 2 n.1.
25 Id. at 4.
" Id. at 4-5; Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1203.
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corporation is run. No significant subsidiary relationships ex-
ist between himself and the corporation through which he re-
ceives a return on his investment.27
As a consequence of these various stockholder-corpora-
tion relationships, the reasons behind a minority freezeout in
each context may differ greatly. In a closely-held corporation,
the reasons behind a freezeout may be based on very personal
considerations or on activities of a stockholder in a role other
than that of stockholder. 8 In a going private situation, the
motivating factors are less personal and can easily be divided
into two basic categories. If the enterprise is one which is po-
tentially highly prosperous, the freezeout may be aimed at ap-
propriating the future profit for the majority stockholders.29
Alternatively, the goal may be to eliminate a sufficient num-
ber of public stockholders in order to obtain relief from SEC
'7 See Note, Delaware Reverses its Trend in Going-Private Transactions: The
Forgotten Majority, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 567, 602-03 (1978).
Today, however, the public shareholder's investment is primarily specula-
tive in nature. Generally he is neither employed by the corporation nor does
he meaningfully participate in its growth. The investor's reasonable expec-
tations are focused on the corporation's ability to achieve a profitable re-
turn on his investment. Thus, the right of continued participation reflects
neither the investor's interest within the corporation nor his reasonable ex-
pectations concerning his investment.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Gibson, How Fixed are Class Shareholder Rights?,
23 L. & CoNTEhip. PaoB. 283 (1958); Comment, supra note 6.
21 F. O'NWEAL, supra note 1, at 11-56 (1975). In this chapter the author outlines
and discusses a number of incentives for freezing out a particular stockholder in a
closely held or a family corporation. The reasons he lists are based to a great extent
on the types of personalities in the business. Enumerated are such motivations as the
drive of superior talent to oust the oldsters and the desire to remove an uncoopera-
tive stockholder creating controversy in the business.
29 The future profitability of the corporation, as respects the majority, may be
enhanced by freezing out the minority in several ways. There might be a synergistic
gain as a result of merging the businesses. A merger may also facilitate long-term
debt financing or it may increase economic efficiency by reducing the duplication of
activities between the corporations. Furthermore, conflicts of interest may be elimi-
nated between the two corporations. Since the minority is removed as a consequence
of the merger, however, the result is that the profitability of these factors inures pri-
marily to the benefit of the remaining majority.
This point is most evident in the pure going private transaction, i.e., merger with
a sham corporation. The profitability in this instance lies almost entirely in getting
rid of the minority and retaining control in the hands of the majority. See McClure,
Are Freeze-Outs Thawing in Going Private Transactions?, 15 Hous. L. R-v. 907,
910-11 (1978); Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 225-26.
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registration requirements."0
B. The Mechanics of Going Private
The close corporation-public corporation distinction has
some impact on determining what mechanisms are available
for freezing out minority stockholders. In a privately-owned
corporation, a stockholder may be effectively frozen out of the
enterprise without losing his stockholder status. For example,
if the stockholder is an employee of the corporation and gets
most of his return through his salary, he could be frozen out
simply by the loss of his job.31 In a public corporation, how-
ever, the primary result is that the target owner is pushed
completely out of his stockholder status. This may be accom-
plished by a merger, a tender offer, or a reverse stock split.
Each method deserves further attention.
1. Mergers
Statutory mergers or consolidations frequently are used
as a freezeout device. 2 Every state has a statute which per-
mits two or more corporations to combine as one without
unanimous approval by the stockholders. 3 Some statutes pro-
vide for two different merger procedures: a long form and a
short form.
In a long form merger, the directors of each corporation
30 Briefly, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78a) requires regis-
tration with the SEC whenever the corporation meets certain criteria regarding the
number of stockholders and the amounts of assets. Registration entails certain re-
porting requirements and restrictions on trading in the securities, which in turn bene-
fit the public stockholder. By reducing the number of stockholders below 300, the
corporation is relieved of these restrictions, and those benefits to the public stock-
holders are lost. See F. O'Nm, supra note 1, at 364 (1975); McClure, supra note 29,
at 908-09; Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, What Constitutes a Valid Purpose for a
Merger?, 51 TEMp. L.Q. 852, 868-70 (1978); Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903,
904-05 (1975).
21 F. O'Nm, supra note 1, (1975), deals almost exclusively with the various
types of freezeout techniques which might be effective in a close corporation. As the
author notes, in the context of the close corporation, "partial squeezeouts" also occur;
in these situations, the majority merely reduces the participation of certain groups
without completely forcing them out. Id. at 1.




must approve the plan of merger, including the formula by
which the stockholders receive shares, obligations, or other se-
curities of the surviving corporation. The plan must then be
approved by the requisite number of stockholders, a number
which is provided by the applicable statute. If the plan is ap-
proved, it then is filed in the appropriate public office.3 4 In
order for a short form merger to occur, one corporation must
own a certain percentage of the stock of the other, usually
around 90%. If that requirement is met, then all that is
needed to effectuate the merger is approval by the parent cor-
poration's board of directors. The stockholders of the target
corporation do not vote regarding the merger." Any dissent-
ing stockholder, however, may force the corporation to pay
him the appraised value of his stock. 6
The merger is an attractive freezeout device because
many merger statutes permit an exchange of securities or obli-
gations of the surviving corporation with markedly different
rights than those attending the stockholder's original shares.
In exchange for his original shares, a stockholder might re-
ceive debentures, bonds, or redeemable preferred shares; these
amount to little more than a promise to pay cash with interest
at some future date. 7 In such a case, the continued participa-
tion of the minority shareholder is largely fictional. In addi-
tion, some merger statutes allow an outright exchange of cash
for the shares of the minority. 8 In this manner, the public
stockholders in a going private merger may be removed com-
pletely from continued equity participation in the
corporation.3 9
11 Id. at 255. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 1978).
35 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 422-23 (1978). An
exemplary short form merger statute is provided in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253
(Supp. 1978).
36 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 255, 326-46 (1975). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262 (1974).
17 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 255 (1975).
's DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 & 253 (1974); F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 256
(1975); McClure, supra note 29, at 914-15.
"' See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v.
Int'l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc.,





Basically, a tender offer is a formal offer by a certain
party to purchase all or substantially all of the outstanding
publicly-held shares of a corporation at a designated price per
share.40 Technically, this is a voluntary tramsaction; that is,
any stockholder who does not wish to sell his shares may re-
fuse the tender offer despite what other stockholders may
choose to do. Realistically, however, a tender offer can be
highly coercive and for this reason is useful as a freezeout
device.41
A tender offer may be coercive in at least two respects.
First, it may be only the first step in a two-step transaction.
In such a case, it is used by the majority only to obtain suffi-
cient voting power to consummate a cash out merger. When
this occurs, the minority stockholders are compelled to par-
ticipate for fear of being pushed out in a subsequent merger
at even less desirable terms.42 Furthermore, even if no second
step is contemplated in a given instance, the targets of the
tender offer are faced with the prospect that the stock will
become worthless if they do not participate. If the tender
proves reasonably successful, the market for the remaining
stock will become so small that the stock will lose its liquidity
in the hands of nonparticipating stockholders.43 Requiring
disclosure of these possibilities is no help; it merely increases
the fears of the target shareholders. In fact, disclosure has a
"whipsaw" effect in which the stockholders rush to sell to the
offeror even though they may not be satisfied with the terms
of the offer. 4
10 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 230, 361 (1975); McClure, supra note 29, at 911.
41 See generally 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35, at 422-32; F.
O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 230-31 (1975); Brudney, supra note 6, at 1039-44; Brudney
& Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1360-65; Greene, supra note 22, at 509 n.69; Corporate
Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 690-93; Note, supra note 30, at 916-19.
42 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1361-62; Greene, supra note 22, at 509
n.69.
4. Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 690-93; Note, supra note 30, at 916-19.
4' Brudney, supra note 6, at 1040-41; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at
692-93. On the other hand, Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1360-62 and
Greene, supra note 22, at 509 suggest that disclosure of the subsequent merger and
the fact that the price at merger will be no lower than the tender offer will help to
1980-81]
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3. Reverse Stock Splits
Reverse stock splits usually are employed in states where
no short form merger is available.45 This procedure involves a
recapitalization of the corporation in which the number of
outstanding shares is significantly reduced, leaving certain mi-
nority stockholders who held only small amounts of the old
stock holding fractional shares of the new stock. The corpora-
tion then exercises its statutory power to repurchase the frac-
tional shares, thereby cashing out the minority.
4
C. The Insider-Outsider Dichotomy
The approval of the majority shareholders is necessary to
the completion of any freezeout transaction. Thus, in one
sense, all freezeout situations will involve corporate insiders.
The impetus for the freezeout, however, may come from those
outside the corporation as well. This is particularly likely at
the first stage of a two-step transaction, at which point an
outside corporation or individual may be instrumental.
Whether the freezeout is precipitated by insiders or outsiders
is a crucial distinction in the analysis of a given transaction.
The importance of this distinction is its effect on the par-
adigm of the arm's length bargain. If an outsider is attempt-
ing to gain control of a corporation, the majority on the inside
of the corporation will bargain with the outsider regarding the
terms of the takeover. While the majority is primarily protect-
ing its own interests, the result, absent any fraudulent self-
dealing, is a degree of protection for the minority position as
well. When the inside majority is trying to appropriate the mi-
nority interests for itself, however, the insiders may well be on
both sides of the transaction. This situation contains the po-
tential for self-dealing and is inconsistent with the concept of
avoid the coercive whipsaw effect. Brudney & Chirelstein suggest therein that Singer
was in fact such a case.
,5 2 J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER
OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE 14 (1976); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35,
at 423.
11 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35, at 423. An example of this type
of transaction is Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54 (IIl. 1974).
[Vol. 69
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an arm's length bargain.47
D. The Importance of Factual Variations
The different factual possibilities heretofore discussed il-
lustrate the complexity of the freezeout problem. Any attempt
to control minority freezeouts which is not geared to these dif-
ferent factual contexts will run the risk of being ineffective or
of unduly restricting legitimate activities of the corporation.
The focus of this Note is on only one of the freezeout var-
iations-the going private merger. Such transactions usually
are precipitated by insiders and accomplished by cashing out
the minority. The purpose of discussing the various factual
contexts of freezeout transactions was to place the going pri-
vate merger in proper perspective vis-a-vis corporate law at-
tempts to deal with the problems of going private.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF STATE LAW ATTEMPTS TO
CONTROL GOING PRIVATE4 s
After the United States Supreme Court ruled in Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green4 that section 10(b) of the Securities
47 The best discussion of this aspect of going private transactions is in Brudney
& Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1357-59. That commentary suggests that the legiti-
macy of a going private transaction is measured by the extent to which it approaches
an arm's length bargain. According to this analysis, a two-step transaction (tender
offer by outsider followed by merger) is the closest to an arm's length bargain. It
requires no fiduciary duty analysis. On the other hand, an "inside" merger with a
sham corporation is far removed from the concept of an arm's length bargain and
should be entirely prohibited.
4" One state law approach to the going private problem which will not be dis-
cussed involves the application of blue sky laws. The most interesting application of
this approach can be found in the New York case of People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc.,
371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Misc. 1975). In that case, the state attorney general brought an
action under the New York Martin Act (or blue sky law) and was able to enjoin the
merger as fraudulent.
Blue sky laws are very limited in their application to going private transactions
and generally are not geared toward the issues involved in going private. The Wiscon-
sin statute, Wis. ADM. CODE § 6.05 (1978), is one of the few statutes that deals di-
rectly with the problem. See 2 J. FLOM, M. LIPrON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 45,
at 43-45; 1 M. LInON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35, at 455-56; Kaplan, Fiduciary
Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883, 884 n.3
(1976); Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 690-91 n.33.
41 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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Act and rule 10b-5 were not designed to cover going private
transactions challenged on the basis of substantive fraud, the
Delaware Supreme Court became the leader in dealing with
corporate freezeouts.50 The Delaware approach, however, is
not a novel one; other courts have taken a similar course.
A. Present Delaware Law
The first important post-Green Delaware case was Singer
v. Magnavox Co.51 The plaintiffs therein challenged the proce-
dure used by T.M.C. Development Corporation (T.M.C.) to
merge with Magnavox Co., the merger being part and parcel
of a larger effort by North American Philips Corporation
(North American) to acquire Magnavox. T.M.C. was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of North American Philips Development
Corporation (Development), which was entirely owned by
North American. The subsidiaries were created by North
American solely to aid in acquiring Magnavox. The acquisi-
tion began with a tender offer by Development, which was ap-
proved (after some negotiation) by the board of Magnavox.
The offer included statements of the intention of Develop-
ment to obtain full control of Magnavox by subsequent means
as well, i.e., a merger. As a result of the tender offer, Develop-
ment acquired 84.1% of the total Magnavox stock. Develop-
ment planned a long form merger between Magnavox and
T.M.C. in which the remaining stockholders would get cash
for their shares at the same rate provided in the tender offer."2
The plaintiffs were minority stockholders of Magnavox
who sought to nullify the merger. The case reached the Dela-
ware Supreme Court on appeal from the court of chancery,
which had granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. 3
The starting point of the court's analysis was the fiduci-
50 The decision in Green was in part responsible for the action of the Delaware
Supreme Court in Singer. The court noted that the Green opinion placed the respon-
sibility for controlling the internal affairs of corporations on state shoulders. 380 A.2d
at 976 n.6.
81 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
52 Id. at 971-72.
11 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976).
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ary duty which the majority stockholders owed to the minor-
ity. 5 4 As a consequence of this fiduciary relationship, it was
found to be "within the responsibility of an equity court to
scrutinize a corporate act when it is alleged that its purpose
violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders." 55
Out of this fiduciary duty, the court derived two standards.
First, it was said to be a clear violation of the fiduciary duty
to consummate a merger solely to freeze out the minority
shareholders. A separate and proper business purpose must be
found to exist.58 Second, regardless of the purpose of the
merger, the circumstances of the merger must meet a test of
intrinsic fairness. 7
All that was really decided by the Singer court, however,
was that a complaint was sufficient if it alleged that a cash out
merger had as its sole purpose freezing out the minority.58
- 380 A.2d at 976. This duty is described in Comment, Corporate Freeze-Outs
Effected by Merger: The Search for a Rule, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 115, 120 (1975).
Although writing prior to the Singer decision, that author felt that the fiduciary duty
concept was being expanded beyond its traditional bounds:
The traditional theory of fiduciary obligation as the test of majority share-
holder responsibility to the minority has come under attack in view of the
increasingly complex transactions effected in the business community. An
argument which has gained support in recognition of the validity of such
criticism is based on an "expanded" fiduciary theory; i.e., the majority, like
a director, assumes a position of trust with respect to all transactions in-
volving the corporation. This theory is clearly a departure from the tradi-
tional view that imposed a fiduciary duty upon the majority only with re-
spect to transactions with the corporation. Even the few jurisdictions
holding corporate insiders to fiduciary standards in their dealings with
shareholders have traditionally required only disclosure of all material
facts. The expanded fiduciary theory, in addition to imposing a duty of dis-
closure, would further require the controlling shareholders to prove that
every transaction affecting the minority was executed in good faith and was
inherently fair. While it is at least arguable that such a standard should be
legally enforceable in all transactions because it reflects a fundamental in-
terest of society, it is clear that imposition of such a standard represents a
departure from the traditional concept of majority responsibility to the
minority.
Id. (footnotes omitted). This reasoning suggests that although the Singer court- ats °
tempted to keep its rule within traditional corporate law concepts, it in fact altered
the notion of fiduciary duty.
380 A.2d at 979.
Id. at 980.
57 Id.
" We hold, therefore, that a § 251 merger, made for the sole purpose of
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The court did not elaborate further on either the business
purpose or the intrinsic fairness test, since further discussion
was unnecessary in light of the issue presented. 9
The business purpose test surfaced again in Tanzer v. In-
ternational General Industries Inc.60 In Tanzer, the plain-
tiffs, stockholders of Kliklok Corporation, were seeking to en-
join a merger of Kliklok and KLK Corporation, a subsidiary
of International General Industries, Inc. (IGI). KLK had been
formed to effectuate the merger. IGI owned 81% of the stock
of Kliklok and was proceeding with the long form merger be-
tween Kliklok and KLK, intending to cash out the minority
stockholders of Kliklok. The complaint alleged that the
merger was fraudulent in that it was pursued solely in the in-
terests of IGI, the parent corporation."'
The court adopted the Singer fiduciary duty analysis as
its starting point but noted that majority stockholders also
have certain interests to be protected. Accordingly, a majority
stockholder has the right to vote his shares pursuant to his
own interests, as long as his actions are within the confines of
the applicable fiduciary duty.62 Thus, the court concluded,
while the parent may not merge with the subsidiary for the
sole purpose of freezing out the minority, it may do so for a
bona fide purpose which is solely in the interests of the par-
ent. 3 The court then found that the purpose recited by the
defendants-facilitation of long-term debt financing by IGI
-was a bona fide purpose." Even so, the defendants were left
freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and
the complaint, which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of action for vio-
lation of a fiduciary duty for which the Court may grant such relief as it
deems appropriate under the circumstances.
Id.
59 Id. at 980 n.11. See Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 233; Rights of Minor-
ity Shareholders, supra note 5, at 995.
'0 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
81 Id. at 1122-23.
82 Id. at 1123-24.
Id. at 1124. Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 233; Comment, Freeze Out
Mergers Under Section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law-The Effect
of Singer and Tanzer, 23 ViL. L. REv. 1159, 1164-66 (1977-78) (analysis of the Tanzer
approach).
" 379 A.2d at 1124-25.
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with the burden of showing the intrinsic fairness of the trans-
action, the second branch of the Singer test.6 5
The most recent pronouncement of the Delaware Su-
preme Court regarding going private mergers is contained in
Roland International Corp. v. Najjar.6 As in Singer, the case
involved a motion by the defendants to dismiss the complaint
of the minority stockholders for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion. Unlike Singer, however, the case involved a short form
merger.68
In Najjar, the holders of 97.6% of the stock of Roland
International Corp. (Roland), consisting of Hyatt Corporation
and certain individuals, chartered Landro Corporation for the
purpose of merging with Roland. These stockholders ex-
changed their Roland stock for Landro stock and proposed a
short form merger between the two, intending that the minor-
ity stockholders be cashed out of the enterprise. 9
The Delaware court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action to the extent that it stated the sole purpose of
the merger was to freeze out the minority and that the ex-
change price was grossly inadequate.7 0 In so holding, the court
expanded the Singer-Tanzer principles to cover short form
mergers as well as long form mergers. The court held that the
extent of the minority holdings did not alter the fiduciary ob-
ligation which existed.7 1 Thus, the bona fide purpose and in-
trinsic fairness tests of Singer applied equally to the Najjar
situation.
Not only did these three cases provide certain standards
by which to control going private mergers, they further served
to establish two basic rules of corporate law. First, these cases
explicitly decided that an exercise of corporate power by the
15 Id. Cf. Comment, supra note 63, at 1167, wherein the commentator suggests
that Singer did not actually stand for the proposition that a showing of a proper
business purpose would be sufficient to meet the fiduciary duty. It is suggested that
to the extent Tanzer holds this, a separate defense was made available.
" 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
67 Id. at 1034.
" Id. at 1033.
69 Id. at 1033-34.
71 Id. at 1037.
71 Id. at 1036.
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majority was not beyond attack merely because the statutory
procedures were strictly followed.72 The fiduciary duty applies
to all corporate transactions and gives an equity court a basis
for scrutinizing a transaction even though statutory require-
ments are met. Second, the court held that the fiduciary duty
could not be satisfied simply by relegating any disgruntled mi-
nority stockholders to the statutory appraisal remedy.73 In ef-
fect, the court held that appraisal was not an exclusive rem-
edy. These holdings were essential in view of legislative
history as it then existed.
B. Historical Milieu of Singer, Tanzer and Najjar
The response of the court in Singer, Tanzer and Najjar
resulted from a clash between the general trend toward flex-
ibility in corporate power and judicial distaste for the going
private transaction. Thus, Delaware's going private law was
shaped by legislative and judicial trends which predated
Singer.
1. Legislative Developments Favoring Corporate Flexibility
The legislative trend toward corporate flexibility is best
shown by the development of merger statutes. At common law
a corporation could participate in a merger only if it were able
to get unanimous approval of its stockholders.74 Thus, a single
stockholder could block a merger deemed to be desirable by
an overwhelming majority of the stockholders; the stockholder
71 Roland v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 1034; Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d at 975; Ter-
rell & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 30, at 855.
71 Roland v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 1034; Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d at 977; Ter-
rell & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 30, at 855.
74 See, e.g., Schenley Indus. Inc. v. Curtis, 152 A.2d 300, 301 (Del. 1959); Tesch-
ner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54, 56 (Ill. 1974); Bauman v. Advance
Aluminum Castings Corp., 169 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ill. App. 1960); Gabhart v. Gabhart,
370 N.E.2d 345, 352-53 (Ind. 1977). For a discussion of the subsequent statutory
alterations of this common law rule, see F. O'NWEAL, supra note 1, at 218-20; Balotti,
The Elimination of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of
the General Corporation Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63, 64-65 (1976);
Lynch, A Concern for the Interest of Minority Shareholders Under Modern Corpo-
ration Laws, 3 J. CORP. L. 19, 27-31 (1977); Comment, supra note 54, at 117; Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 1422-23.
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essentially had a vested right in the form of his investment.
State legislatures responded by passing merger statutes which
required less than a unanimous vote to approve the merger.
New York was first to do so in 1890.75 Delaware did not follow
suit until much later.78 The various voting requirements were
reduced repeatedly until, at present, the Delaware statute re-
quires only a majority vote.77
Short form mergers were equally significant innovations,
serving to increase corporate flexibility while simultaneously
weakening the ability of the stockholders to avoid a merger.
New York was again the pacesetter, providing a short form
statute for public utilities in 192378 and expanding it to in-
clude corporations generally in 1949.71 In 1937 Delaware
adopted its first short form merger statute, applicable only to
wholly-owned subsidiaries.80 In 1957 Delaware reduced the
ownership requirement to its present level of 90%.81
Until 1941, the Delaware merger statute required an ex-
change of shares in the resulting corporation for shares in the
old corporations.82 In that year the statute was amended to
also allow conversion into securities.8 3 In 1955, the statute was
again amended, this time to permit an exchange of cash for
fractional shares." In 1967 Delaware first allowed an exchange
of cash for whole shares.85
It should be clear from the developments mentioned
above that the legislative trend has been to erode the absolute
right of the stockholder to maintain the form of his invest-
ment. The intention was to increase the flexibility of the cor-
porate form, but the result has been to substantially alter the
nature of the stockholders' interest.
71 1890 N.Y. Laws 1060.
76 36 Del. Laws ch. 135 (1929).
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974).
78 1923 N.Y. Laws ch. 9, art. 8, § 85 (applicable only to public utility companies).
' 1949 N.Y. Laws ch. 762, art. 8, § 85.
80 50 Del. Laws ch. 131 (1937).
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1957).
82 36 DeL Laws ch. 135 (1929).
83 43 Del. Laws ch. 132, § 12 (1941).
8 50 Del. Laws ch. 467 (1955).
85 56 Del. Laws ch. 186, § 16 (1967).
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2. Delaware Case Law Developments Regarding Vested
Rights
State legislatures were not alone in their efforts to expand
corporate flexibility; the judiciary matched them step for step.
A line of cases dealing with the right to accrued cumulative
preferred dividends illustrates this point. In Keller v. Wilson
& Co.,8" the common stockholders attempted to alter the ac-
crued dividend rights of the holders of cumulative preferred
stock through an amendment of the certificate of incorpora-
tion. At the time the corporation was formed and the pre-
ferred stockholders obtained their stock, the corporation stat-
ute did not provide for such an amendment of the charter.
Subsequently the statute was revised to recognize the desired
procedure, and the common stockholders attempted to take
advantage of this change to the detriment of the preferred
stockholders. The Delaware Supreme Court refused to permit
this on the ground that the accrued cumulative dividends
were vested property rights:
While many interrelations of the State, the corporation, and
the shareholders may be changed, there is a limit beyond
which the State may not go. Property rights may not be de-
stroyed; and when the nature and character of the right of a
holder of cumulative preferred stock to unpaid dividends,
which have accrued thereon through passage of time, is ex-
amined in a case where that right was accorded protection
when the corporation was formed and the stock was issued,
a just public policy, which seeks the equal and impartial
protection of the interests of all, demands that the right be
regarded as a vested right of property secured against de-
struction by the Federal and State Constitutions.8 7
In a broader sense this type of vested rights theory appears to
focus on protecting the form of the stockholder's investment
from encroachments by those who control the corporate
machinery.
The vested rights theory did not last. In Federal United
8 190 A. 115 (Del. 1936).
97 Id. at 124-25.
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Corp. v. Havender,5 the holders of the common stock sought
to destroy the accrued cumulative dividend rights of the pre-
ferred stockholders through a merger of the corporation with
an inactive wholly-owned subsidiary. The court approved, dis-
tinguishing Keller and limiting it to its particular facts, i.e.,
where no power to amend the charter exists prior to the issu-
ance of the preferred stock.89 The court then held that the
right of the corporation to merge is part of the stockholder's
contract, of which he is presumed to be aware.90 Even more
interesting is the court's suggestion that the statutory provi-
sions for amendment of the charter and merger are to be con-
sidered independently.9 1 Thus, a result which could not be ac-
complished by amendment could be achieved through merger.
A further corollary of this rule was added by the Third Circuit
in Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp.,9 2 applying Dela-
ware law. The Hottenstein court concluded that a merger
which destroyed accrued cumulative dividend rights was per-
missible, even though it was accomplished with an inactive
subsidiary created specifically for the purpose of such a
merger.
9 3
These legislative and judicial developments established
the framework within which the Delaware court was working
when faced with similar situations in the freezeout context.
'4
88 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940).
89 Id. at 339.
90 Consequently, in a case where a merger of corporations is permitted by
the law and is accomplished in accordance with the law, the holder of cu-
mulative preference stock as to which dividends have accumulated may not
insist that his right to the dividends is a fixed contractual right in the na-
ture of a debt, in that sense vested and, therefore, secure against attack.
Looking to the law which is a part of the corporate charter, and, therefore,
a part of the shareholder's contract, he has not been deceived nor lulled
into the belief that the right to such dividends is firm and stable. On the
contrary, his contract has informed him that the right is defeasible; and
with that knowledge the stock was acquired.
Id.
,1 Id. at 342.
" 136 F.2d 944 (3rd Cir. 1943).
9 Id. at 953.
Although it is possible to take the position that this line of cases has nothing
to do with freezeout mergers, it is clear that these cases do reveal the extent to which
the courts were willing to facilitate corporate flexibility. For a criticism of applying
the Havender reasoning to freezeout mergers, see Balotti, supra note 74, at 76-77;
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Clearly the impetus of these developments was away from the
idea that a stockholder had a vested interest in the form of his
investment. The trend was in favor of corporate flexibility, the
upshot being that a corporation could legally accomplish indi-
rectly that which it could not do directly. That the same rea-
soning could be applied to going private mergers is a notion
not easily dismissed.
C. Analysis of Standards Applied in the State Law
Approach
When the Delaware Supreme Court first faced the prob-
lem of the going private merger in Singer, it needed to pro-
vide some control over an undesirable situation while respect-
ing the force of precedent concerning corporate power. While
it is arguable that the court failed to deal effectively with the
precedent it discussed,"' it is clear that the court attempted to
fit the going private issue into the mainstream of corporate
law by relying on traditional concepts like fiduciary duty." It
was from this fiduciary duty that the court derived the busi-
ness (or bona fide purpose) and intrinsic fairness tests.
An analysis of the Delaware approach, therefore, must
center around the traditional categories used in Singer. Al-
though such an approach may not provide effective control
over going private mergers, it does provide a logical founda-
tion upon which one may examine alternative methods of cop-
ing with the going private problem.
1. Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary duty owed by the majority stockholders
serves as the basis for controlling going private transactions.
7
As a result of this fiduciary duty, the majority is required to
have a bona fide business purpose for the merger and is re-
quired to prove the intrinsic fairness of the terms of the
Lynch, supra note 74, at 40-41.
Note, supra note 27, at 583-84.
Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 30, at 854-55.
97 "The unmistakable focus in Singer was on the law of fiduciary duty." Roland
Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979).
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merger.9 8 These standards are largely meaningless, however,
until defined in specific freezeout situations.
In Singer the fiduciary duty was described as the obliga-
tion the majority stockholders "owed to the minority stock-
holders of that corporation . . . in dealing with the latter's
property."99 As suggested by the reference to the minority's
property, this concept of fiduciary duty is akin to the duties
owed by a trustee to the cestui que trust. This duty at first
applied only to corporate directors, being later extended to
majority stockholders.100 In fact, the court in Singer defined
the fiduciary duty with a long quote from a director's duty
case,101 adding that "the spirit of the definition is equally ap-
plicable to a majority stockholder in any context in which the
law imposes a fiduciary duty on that stockholder for the bene-
fit of minority stockholders."'0 2 The extent to which a duty
meant for trustees and directors in their dealings with the
property of others is applicable to the dynamic relations be-
tween stockholders in a corporation, all of whom have prop-
erty interests in the corporation, is a pivotal consideration.
In Tanzer the court noted the existence of a fiduciary
duty but went on to consider the realities of the majority-mi-
nority stockholder relationship. 03 The Tanzer court recog-
nized that the majority stockholders have certain rights as
stockholders, i.e., they may vote their stock in a self-inter-
ested manner. Such stockholders, unlike directors, have the
right to vote their shares in a fashion designed to suit their
personal interests. This is coextensive with the right that mi-
'8 [The] Supreme Court of Delaware reaffirmed the recently eroded "entire
fairness" standard which places upon the majority shareholders standing on
both sides of the transaction the burden of proving the merger's fairness to
the minority. The court also established a new "valid purpose" test which
requires the majority to prove some economic purpose for the merger. To-
gether, these two standards set forth the fiduciary duty owed to minority
shareholders.
Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 224-25 (footnotes omitted).
" 380 A.2d at 976.
100 Id. at 976-77; F. O'Nm, supra note 1, at 508-11 (1975); Comment, supra
note 54, at 120.
10' 380 A.2d at 977.
102 Id.
103 379 A.2d at 1123.
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nority stockholders have to vote for activities which they per-
ceive to be in their interests and to their profit.1°4 As a matter
of corporate democracy, it is the majority which rules, yet this
is no reason to lose sight of the fact that the majority consists
of stockholders.
10 5
Although this discussion is somewhat simplified, it does
serve to demonstrate the inappropriateness of dealing with
the going private problem on the basis of fiduciary duty. This
was tacitly recognized by the Tanzer court, which noted that
the majority have interests as stockholders which may be in-
consistent with their fiduciary status. Accordingly, the court
relaxed the business purpose test somewhat, allowing some
"selfishness" on behalf of the majority.108 The resulting test is
much more consistent with the realities of the going private
problem. Unfortunately, this initial step toward focusing on
the dynamics of the majority-minority stockholder relation-
ship may be limited to those mergers occurring in the parent-
subsidiary context. The Najjar court, dealing with a merger
not of the parent-subsidiary variety, found that the "unmis-
takable focus" was on the law of fiduciary duty.
10 7
The fiduciary duty concept seems more a statement of a
result than a definition of the relationship between majority
and minority stockholders. The focus should be on a more
fundamental level, based as such on the connections between
the minority stockholders and the corporation and the reason-
able expectations which that relationship entails.10 In a close
corporation, these connections can be multi-faceted and high-
ly significant. The minority stockholder may be an officer or
an employee. He may devote large amounts of time to working
for the corporation and receive his return primarily in the
104 Id. at 1123-24. The court then quoted from Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Com. Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947), noting that, "Generally speaking, a
shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it is
not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by
whims or caprice, so long as he violates no duty owed his fellow shareholders." Id. at
447.
100 Note, supra note 27, at 604-05.
100 379 A.2d at 1123-24.
107 407 A.2d at 1034.
"I Note, supra note 27, at 598.
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form of salary."°' Such a stockholder is not in any real sense
comparable to the public stockholder, whose only connection
to the corporation is as an investor.110 In fact, the cases dis-
tinguish between stockholders on this basis by requiring a
stricter fiduciary duty among stockholders in a close
corporation.1"
To a great extent the concept of fiduciary duty is closely
linked to a vested rights theory of stock ownership.11 2 In
Singer, the court expressly states that the stockholder has an
interest in the form as well as the value of his investment.',,
Singer is not wrong in this respect; it is simply that the form
of the investment being protected is not a vested property
right. As was noted in the discussion of the legislative and ju-
dicial history which preceded the Singer line of cases, the ab-
solute right of a stockholder to prevent a change in the form
of his investment is an historical anachronism.114 In addition,
the rights of the stockholder to be protected via the fiduciary
duty of the majority differ with the context in which the stock
is owned. The public stockholder in a public corporation is in
reality concerned only with the value of his stock as an invest-
ment. His interest is in a sense one-dimensional.11 5 Where a
close corporation is concerned, the court should be more solic-
itous of the minority stockholder's position, since the form of
his investment includes a variety of connections to the enter-
prise. In any event, to state that a fiduciary duty exists vis-a-
vis the form of the minority's investment is meaningless un-
less the actual nature of that investment is investigated. Only
then can the stockholder's damage be accurately assessed in
109 See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of
minority stockholders in a close corporation.
110 Terrell & Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 30, at 866-67; Note, supra note 27, at
602-04; Comment, supra note 54, at 130-32; Comment, supra note 6, at 813-14.
III E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). See F. O'NEA,
supra note 1, at iv-v.
112 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35, at 444; Note, supra note 27, at
600-02.
"' 380 A.2d at 977-78.
114 See notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legisla-
tive precedent prior to Singer.
"' Note, supra note 27, at 602-04.
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the freezeout context. 16 If a stockholder's interest in the en-
terprise is only an investment interest, protection of the form
of the investment is overbroad.
2. Business Purpose
The business or bona fide purpose test provides much of
the content of the fiduciary duty approach of Singer-Tanzer-
Najjar." In order to protect the form of the minority stock-
holder's investment from undue encroachment by the major-
ity, the latter must demonstrate compliance with the bona
fide purpose test. Only then may the cash out merger be com-
pleted.1 " The bona fide purpose test means two things. It
means that no merger will be permitted where the sole pur-
pose is to freeze out the minority. Additionally, it requires
that the majority demonstrate a bona fide purpose for engag-
ing in the merger transaction. The test is perceived as a com-
promise between the property interest of the minority stock-
holder and the need for a degree of corporate flexibility."1
Although the second part of the test is more complex, it is
the first part of the test upon which Najjar has had the most
impact. Singer held that a long form merger could not be pur-
sued for the sole purpose of cashing out the minority. It was
unclear prior to Najjar whether that rule would be applied to
"'I Ultimately, minority shareholder protection which extends beyond the
fair value of the investor's shares assumes that the minority's interest
within the corporation is not exclusively economic. Neither courts nor com-
mentators, however, have identified the nature of the shareholder's
noneconomic interest .... A breach of fiduciary duty which produces no
injury surely is not actionable. Furthermore, the implication that the share-
holder's elimination itself is the injury merely begs the question. Aside from
investment valuation, the issue critically posed is whether the shareholder's
elimination is an injury.
Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
1 Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 224-25.
118 Roland v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 1034; Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d at 978;
Tanzer v. IGI, 379 A.2d at 1124; see McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial
Scrutiny of Merger-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus.
LAW. 2231, 2235-39 (1978); McClure, supra note 29, at 927-29; Rights of Minority
Shareholders, supra note 5, at 986-87.
11 See Note, Long Form Merger for Sole Purpose of Eliminating Minority In-
terest Constitutes Actionable Fiduciary Breach; Valid Merger Requires Showing of
Business Purpose and Entire Fairness, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 712, 730 (1978).
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short form mergers.
At the time the Najjar litigation arose, the seminal Dela-
ware case on short form mergers was Stauffer v. Standard
Brands, Inc.,120 which involved a merger between parent and
subsidiary. The minority stockholders in the subsidiary were
given cash for their stock. A minority stockholder brought suit
claiming that the cash offered for the stock was grossly inade-
quate and asked that the merger be set aside.1 21 The court
rejected the argument of the stockholder and affirmed a chan-
cery ruling that appraisal was his sole remedy, absent fraud or
illegality.1 22 The decision was based on two New York cases
construing that state's statute123 because, as explained in
Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.,124 the Delaware
statute borrowed from New York law. The court then went on
to establish this rule:
Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short
merger statute in which there could be such actual fraud as
would entitle a minority to set aside the merger. This is so
because the very purpose of the statute is to provide the
parent corporation with the means of eliminating the minor-
ity shareholder's interest in the enterprise.12
The actual holding, however, was not so broad. The court
found that the dispute concerned only the value of the minor-
ity's stock; therefore appraisal was the only available relief.
1 26
Although Singer dealt with a long form merger, the court
of chancery seized upon Singer's language and applied its rea-
soning to short form mergers in Young v. Valhi, Inc.127 and
Kemp v. Angel.' 28 Thus, it was not surprising that when the
120 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
Id. at 80.
122 Id.
123 Id. The cases cited were Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 87 N.E.2d 561
(N.Y. 1949); and Amella v. Consolidated Edison Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1947),
aff'd, 75 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 1947).
124 154 A.2d 893 (Del. 1959).
125 187 A.2d at 80.
126 Id.
127 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
128 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). For a discussion of these two cases, see 1 M.
LIPToN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35, at 445, 449-50; McClure, supra note 29, at
929-31; Note, supra note 27, at 594-97; Comment, Freeze-Out Merger-Allegation
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Delaware Supreme Court again faced the issue in Najjar it
overruled any contrary implications of Stauffer and held that
the Singer reasoning applied to short form mergers as well.129
Thus, a short form merger effectuated solely to freeze out the
minority is a violation of fiduciary duty. This fiduciary duty is
not lessened just because the minority holdings are very
small.130 Consequently, the bona fide purpose test must be
met. The short form merger statute is not a means by which
the parent corporation may indiscriminately cash out minor-
ity interests in the subsidiary, nor, the court concluded, did
the legislature intend it to be.'31 Given the wisdom of hind-
sight, this final conclusion may well be untenable. The Gen-
eral Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware legislature
has since proposed legislation designed to negate Singer in
short form merger situations.132
The Najjar opinion resolved most issues surrounding the
first part of the bona fide purpose test. There are no excep-
tions to the rule that a merger cannot be justified for the sole
purpose of freezing out the minority. At this point it is the
second part of this test, requiring as it does a bona fide pur-
pose for the merger, that merits careful consideration.
The concept of business purpose is not unique to Dela-
ware law; 33 other jurisdictions applied a business purpose test
to freezeout mergers long before Singer. The leading case in
that Majority Shareholders Effected a Merger for the Sole Purpose of Freezing Out
Minority Shareholders States a Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty-Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 877
(1977-78).
29 407 A.2d at 1036.
30 Id.
Id.
182 Note, supra note 27, at 597.
For a discussion of the cases dealing with the business purpose test prior to
Singer, see 2 J. FLoM, M. LIPTON & E. STMBER, supra note 45, at 17-43; Note,
The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 64 CAL. L. REv. 1184
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Business Purpose Test]; Rights of Minority Sharehold-
ers, supra note 5, at 988-93; Comment, Going Private: Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green-The Supreme Court Decision in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 30 OnuA. L. RE V. 593
(1977); Comment, supra note 54, at 121-26; Comment, supra note 63, at 1166; Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 1426-27.
[Vol. 69
FAIRNEss IN FREEZEOUTS
this regard was Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co.,134 a case in
which all the stockholders of the corporation except one cre-
ated a new corporation to which they contributed their stock.
They then attempted to merge the new corporation with the
old and cash out the remaining stockholder. The court, apply-
ing Georgia law, held that such a merger was an illegal at-
tempt to circumvent the rule prohibiting the majority from
cashing out the minority in the absence of a business purpose
for the merger. 3 5 A business purpose was also required by the
Second Circuit in Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.,136 on
the basis of rule 10b-5.
Certain Delaware cases have also applied a version of the
business purpose rule to other types of transactions.3 In
Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp.,5 8 the majority interests
caused the issuance of additional stock in the corporation and
denied the minority stockholder his preemptive right to buy
some of the new issue. In a suit to cancel the new issue of
stock, the court stated that any "action by majority share-
holders having as its primary purpose the 'freezing out' of a
minority interest is actionable."139 Similarly, in Condec Corp.
v. Lunkenheimer Co.,140 the court applied this reasoning when
the purpose for an issue of stock was alleged to be retention of
corporate control by the majority interests.
Although there is ample precedent to support the appli-
cation of a business purpose test, the substance of the test
itself is discomfortingly unclear. Though there are many areas
which have been left untouched in describing the business
purpose, there are three problematical inquiries which must
be made in order to apply it. It must be determined: 1) whose
purpose may be served; 2) what will suffice as a business pur-
pose; and 3) what activity must be justified.
13 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
'5 Id. at 570.
, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
37 For a discussion of these cases, see Balotti, supra note 75, at 66-67; Lynch,
supra note 74, at 39-40; Note, supra note 27, at 583-84; Note, supra note 119, at 724-
25.
1, 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953).
139 Id. at 239.




The first determination focuses mainly upon whether the
business purpose must stem from the corporation itself or
merely from the individual stockholders in the majority. Ar-
guably this issue was resolved in Tanzer, in which the court
held that a parent corporation, "as a stockholder of [the sub-
sidiary], had a right to look to its own corporate concerns in
determining how to conduct the latter's affairs, including a
decision to cause it to merge. '141 It is clear, therefore, that in
the parent-subsidiary context a business purpose of the par-
ent as a stockholder will justify the merger. If the majority
consists of individual stockholders, however, as was the case
in Najjar, resolution of this issue is not so clear. The cloudi-
ness is the result of the approach taken by the Najjar court,
an approach which failed to adopt the Tanzer reasoning set
forth above.
Apparently the Najjar decision was based on the fact
that a sham corporation was created to facilitate a short form
merger.142 That the merger was of the insider type, presuma-
bly for the sole purpose of freezing out the minority, was em-
phasized. Even so, the court might well have borrowed from
the language of the Tanzer opinion. In failing to extend the
Tanzer concept to situations outside the parent-subsidiary
context, the Najjar court overlooked two factual consistencies
in the cases. In both instances a new corporation was formed
to effectuate the merger. 143 Furthermore, one of the "individ-
ual" shareholders in Najjar was a corporate entity (Hyatt
Corp.), thereby likening the circumstances to that of the par-
ent-subsidiary context.
Moreover, there is no apparent reason why the Tanzer
holding should be limited to the parent-subsidiary situation.
Clearly, individual stockholders are equally entitled to vote
their stock "selfishly. ' 144 Implicit in a limitation of Tanzer to
141 379 A.2d at 1124.
142 407 A.2d at 1037. The court described the merger involved as "a classic 'going
private' transaction." Id.
143 In Tanzer the parent corporation, IGI, formed KLK for the purpose of merg-
ing with Kliklok and freezing out the minority. 379 A.2d at 1122.
144 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com. Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441 (Del.
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the parent-subsidiary context is the notion that the business
purpose need be that of a corporation. This notion is inconsis-
tent with the rationale of Tanzer, that all stockholders, even
those in the majority, may vote their stock pursuant to their
own interests. Ultimately, even in the parent-subsidiary con-
text, it is the stockholders of the parent corporation who ben-
efit at the expense of the minority stockholders of the subsidi-
ary. As long as the purpose is bona fide, it would seem to be
of no real consequence to the minority stockholder whether
the source of that purpose is a corporate or an individual
stockholder.
b. The Content
In any event, no matter what the source of the business
purpose, it must be bona fide. Just what type of motivation is
proper is unclear. The first point to note is that even though
Singer uses the older "business purpose" terminology,
145
Tanzer and Najjar require only that the purpose be "bona
fide. ' 1 " This distinction is not merely semantic; it represents
a substantive change between Singer and Tanzer. The Tanzer
court discusses the distinction in two separate statements,
beginning:
The parties, following the language of some of the cases,
have analyzed the problem in terms of "business purpose"
(or "business reason"), but it seems to us that that is not
helpful because, at best, the phrase is ambiguous and, at
worst, it states a result and not a right or duty.147
And concluding with:
Although we have stated that IGI [the parent] is entitled as
majority stockholder to vote its own corporate concerns, it
should be noted that IGI's purpose in causing the merger
must be bona fide. As a stockholder, IGI need not sacrifice
its own interest in dealing with a subsidiary; but that inter-
est must not be suspect as a subterfuge, the real purpose of
1947), a case cited in Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123, involved individual stockholders.
,45 380 A.2d at 976, 978.
1' Roland v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 1034-35; Tanzer v. IGI, 379 A.2d at 1124.
I' 379 A.2d at 1123.
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which is to rid itself of unwanted minority stockholders in
the subsidiary. 
1 4
This change in terminology was in part intended to reflect the
shift from the corporation as the source of the proper purpose
to a focus on the parent as stockholder. Whether a further
change was intended is uncertain, since a substantive defini-
tion of business purpose never really has been clear.
A few types of business or bona fide purposes have been
suggested (and criticized) in cases and commentaries, with
only a very few having been approved in the cases. In Tanzer,
the court found that improving the long-term debt financing
posture of the parent corporation was a bona fide reason for a
freezeout merger between parent and subsidiary.149 In Grimes
v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,150 the court distin-
guished Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 1 51 on the ground that
there was a valid business purpose for the merger in the for-
mer. The approved purpose was twofold. The corporations
were engaged in the same business, and the merger was in
part meant to remove potential conflicts which existed as long
as there were public shareholders in the subsidiary. Addition-
ally, the merger led to savings in the day-to-day operations of
the corporation amounting to $300,000 yearly.1 52 It is certainly
arguable that both reasons inured solely to the benefit of the
parent in its capacity as stockholder. The only purpose men-
tioned in the cases which cannot be said to inure solely to the
benefit of the majority stockholder was outlined in Polin v.
Conductron Corp.1 53 and Matteson v. Ziebarth.1" In those
cases the court accepted, as a legitimate business purpose,
avoidance of the imminent financial collapse of one of the cor-
porations involved.
The commentators discuss other potential purposes. For
148 Id. at 1124.
14' Id. at 1124-25. See Comment, supra note 63, in which it is suggested that this
is a consequence of any merger.
158 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), affd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975).
151 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
151 392 F. Supp. at 1402. See Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 225-26, which
suggests that these purposes do not require a cashing out of the minority.
1683 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1977).
IN 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
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instance, some argue that the savings to the corporation inci-
dent to relief from the registration requirements of the SEC
should be deemed a proper purpose for going private.15 5
Others argue that it is incongruous to justify pushing out pub-
lic investors to avoid SEC regulations designed for their pro-
tection.156 Some commentators argue that corporate benefits
are obtained from changing the value of the corporate stock
from a depressed market value to a higher book value.1 57 The
dissenters claim that the only justification for increasing stock
values is to attract public investors, and, in any event, in a
going private transaction all of this benefit would inure to the
remaining majority." 8
The value of the business purpose test is greatly reduced
by these divergent views. Not only does this divergence ham-
per a court's analysis of a given transaction, but the deterrent
effect of the entire legal theory is abated as well.1 59 A great
deal of the disagreement is caused by a failure to address the
fundamental issues involved. A part of this problem, the fail-
ure to determine the source of the business purpose, has been
discussed previously.1 60 A much more perplexing problem is
created by the failure to consider exactly what activity must
be justified by a business purpose.
c. The Activity
Ordinarily, two distinct events comprise a going private
transaction. There is the basic corporate change-usually a
merger-and there is the cashing out of minority stockhold-
ers. As yet no court has said which event must be justified by
a business purpose 61 The Najjar opinion exemplifies this
155 Note, supra note 27, at 571-72.
2" Brudney, supra note 6, at 1032-34; Note, supra note 30, at 907; Comment,
supra note 5, at 1439-41.
,57 Note, supra note 27, at 574-75; Comment, supra note 5, at 1444-45.
,58 Brudney, supra note 6, at 1035-36; Note, supra note 30, at 908-09.
29 Comment, supra note 6, at 811. See Note, supra note 27, at 581.
160 See notes 141-44 supra and accompanying text for the discussion of whose
purpose must be justified.
161 McBride, supra note 118, gives an example of the confusion caused by the
failure to make such a distinction:
In a variety of circumstances, the sole purpose of the merger may be to
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oversight. In discussing its earlier Tanzer decision, the court
spoke of the bona fide purpose test as if it had been applied to
both events, failing to note a distinction. The following discus-
sion is taken from the same paragraph:
In Tanzer we held that even when a parent corporation
has a bona fide purpose for merging with its subsidiary, the
minority shareholders . . . are entitled to a judicial review
for "entire fairness". . . . In other words, the fiduciary duty
exists even if the majority has a bona fide purpose for elimi-
nating the minority....162
Focus on this point is crucial, and continuing to ignore it
will merely obfuscate the theory. Requiring a business pur-
pose for the merger itself involves the court in an unnecessar-
ily complex balancing process between the legislative policy of
corporate flexibility and the minority interest in continued
participation in the enterprise. As is expressly stated in
Singer, the minority stockholder has some type of interest in
the form of his investment.16 It is equally clear, however, that
this interest does not outweigh the unequivocal right to merge
granted by state corporation statutes."6 Thus, the desire of a
minority stockholder to retain the present form of his invest-
ment is insufficient to prevent a properly approved merger.
eliminate the minority shareholders, but there is a business reason for elim-
inating the minority shareholders. For instance, it has been suggested that
avoiding the expense of SEC registration may be justification for "going
private." In one sense, a merger in this situation is for the sole purpose of
eliminating minority shareholders. On the other hand, there is a business
purpose behind the elimination of the minority shareholders. Again, Singer
contains no explicit holding on this point.
Id. at 2244.
162 407 A.2d at 1034-35.
163 380 A.2d at 977-78.
164 See notes 78-85 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the right of
a corporation to merge under the corporation statutes.
In this regard, the Singer court noted that-
To state the obvious, under § 251 two (or more) Delaware corporations
"may merge into a single corporation." Generally speaking, whether such a
transaction is good or bad, enlightened or ill-advised, selfish or gener-
ous-these considerations are beside the point. Section 251 authorizes a
merger and any judicial consideration of that kind of togetherness must
begin from that premise.
380 A.2d at 973.
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Concentrating on the merger phase also limits the reme-
dial response of the court. If no proper purpose is found, the
natural response is to enjoin the merger. This is wholly incon-
sistent with the court's equity role, as was noted in the Najjar
dissent:
[T]he Court is tending to flesh out broad equitable princi-
ples into rules and formats that automatically hold mergers
"made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stock-
holders [are] an abuse of the corporate process," that antici-
pate and delineate matters "reserved for another day," that
require "fairness hearing[s]" without express reference to
any specific allegations, and that establish, as the majority
opinion illustrates here, preconceived "threshold require-
ment[s]." The very uniqueness of equity is its ability to re-
act on a case-by-case basis without the rigidity of pigeon-
holes.
265
The Najjar dissent further noted that the basis for the
imposition of judicial scrutiny is the breach of fiduciary duty,
not the violation of a vested property right.1 6  Emphasis on
maintaining the form of the investment, as occurred in
Singer, actually comes very close to acceptance of the type of
outmoded vested rights concept once supported by Keller.1
67
The focus of the bona fide purpose test should be on the
cash out phase of the merger. Given that mergers are en-
couraged transactions regardless of purpose, 6 8 the pivotal
question should be whether the minority stockholders may be
cashed out as a consequence of the merger. Even so, certain
problems arise. The legislature (at least in Delaware) has
clearly approved the use of cash or instruments of debt, as
well as stock, as the medium of exchange in a merger. 6 9 The
statute places no additional restrictions on the use of cash,
such as the imposition of a special business purpose re-
quirement.
17 0
165 407 A.2d at 1038 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 1038 n.4.
6'e This is precisely the argument made by the commentator in Note, supra note
27, at 601-02.
,6" Such was the indication of the court in Singer, 380 A.2d at 978.
16e DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253 (1974).
170 This point is discussed in Singer, 380 A.2d at 975.
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It is difficult to conceive of a bona fide purpose which
would justify cashing out the public stockholders per se.17 1
One can never be found by concentrating on the merger
phase. For instance, consider the purpose accepted in Grimes
v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrett, Inc.," 2 i.e., the avoidance of
conflicts of interests between the parent and the minority
stockholders of the subsidiary. Presumably the parent has mi-
nority stockholders of its own. The conflicts between the par-
ent and subsidiary, then, could just as easily have been re-
moved by giving the minority stockholders shares in the
parent corporation, as opposed to cashing them out.17 3
In light of this discussion of bona fide purpose, it is help-
ful at this point to examine the Brudney-Chirelstein approach
to the going private problem.7 4 According to the view of these
authors, there are three basic types of going private mergers.
These are the tender offer and subsequent merger by an
outside corporation; the absorption of a subsidiary by its par-
ent; and, last, the merger 'effectuated by the creation of a
sham corporation solely for that purpose.175 The authors feel
that in any going private transaction the degree of judicial
scrutiny should be controlled by the type, of merger involved,
adjusted slightly by the facts of each case. In the tender offer
situation, absent some element of overreaching, the court
7 Failing to distinguish the merger phase from the cash out phase in applying
the business purpose test has led to the argument by some commentators that a
merger should not be permitted where the business purpose it would further could be
accomplished by an alternative device. McBride, supra note 118, at 2244; Comment,
supra note 54, at 132-33. It is not really the merger which is the "distasteful" transac-
tion; it is the cashing out of the minority. The inquiry should not be whether there
exists some alternative to the merger, but whether the actual cash out phase of the
merger is necessary.
172 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Fla. 1974).
173 In Grimes, it was accepted as a valid business purpose "that there is a justi-
fied concern that as long as a public minority exists in Meridian [the subsidiary],
joint ventures and business dealings between the corporations will be inhibited by
potential claims of conflict of interest by either Meridian or DLJ [the parent] share-
holders." Id. Even so, it should be recognized that the conflict problem will be re-
moved whenever the parent company obtains complete control over the subsidiary. In
terms of the benefit derived, therefore, it should not matter whether the minority
shareholders are given cash or equity. Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 225-26.
,74 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4. A similar approach is offered in Greene,
supra note 22.
171 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1356.
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should not tamper with the merger as long as the cash out
price is the same as the tender offer price;176 the rationale be-
ing that since the tender offer price is approved by an inde-
pendent board of directors, it is the result of an arm's length
bargain.17 7 In the parent-subsidiary merger, the potential for
self-dealing is greater; therefore, it is felt that the court
should scrutinize the fairness of the merger terms, yet ignore
its purpose.178 The authors feel that in the sham merger situa-
tion the court should automatically enjoin the merger. 17 9 This
approach is not concerned with finding a specific business
purpose. The authors argue that a business purpose is pre-
sumed in the first two situations, but is presumed to be absent
in a sham merger.8 " Although the factual distinctions which
these commentators draw are open to dispute,181 their ap-
proach is a conscious attempt to maintain the integrity of the
merger process per se, while focusing judicial concern on the
cash out phase of the transaction.
1 8 2
3. Intrinsic Fairness and Fairness Hearings
The second requirement of the Singer-Tanzer-Najjar
line is that the majority prove the intrinsic fairness of the
transaction.18 3 The fairness requirement is an additional bur-
den which operates independently of the bona fide purpose
inquiry. As such, the fairness test may remain unsatisfied
even after a business purpose is found; thus, "proof of a pur-
pose, other than. . .[a] freezeout, without more, will not nec-
176 Id. at 1361-62.
177 Id. at 1359-61.
178 Id. at 1371-73.
179 Id. at 1367.
180 Id. at 1356.
181 For one thing, they distinguish between a parent-subsidiary merger in which
the minority stockholders of the subsidiary are cashed out and the so-called going
private transaction, in which the majority stockholders of the corporation force out
the minority through merger with a sham corporation. As discussed in notes 141-45
supra and accompanying text, it is questionable whether, given the fact that a parent
corporation may form a sham corporation in order to merge with its subsidiary, such
a distinction should be made.
's' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 4, at 1357-59.
Roland v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 1034; Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d at 980;
Tanzer v. IGI, 379 A.2d at 1125.
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essarily discharge [the majority's fiduciary duty]. In such case
the court will scrutinize the circumstances for compliance
with the . . . rule of 'entire fairness'. .. .
The test was derived from prior Delaware cases, primarily
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.18 5 Sterling did not involve
a freezeout. Instead it concerned the attempt of Hilton Hotels
Corporation to merge with Mayflower, its subsidiary, via a
share-for-share exchange. The boards of both corporations ap-
proved the terms of the merger, but the minority stockholders
of Mayflower sued to enjoin the merger on the grounds of un-
fairness. Hilton relied on the approval of the boards.186 The
court held that the Hilton-elected directors stood "on both
sides of the transaction, [so] they bear the burden of estab-
lishing its entire fairness, and it must pass the test of careful
scrutiny by the courts. 1 7 The case, therefore, stood for the
proposition that intrinsic fairness must be proven in an inter-
ested merger, i.e., in which one party stands on both sides of
the transaction.
This reasoning was followed in subsequent Delaware
cases as well. In Bastian v. Bourns, Inc.,"8 an individual,
Marlan Bourns, had controlling interests in both corporations
intending to merge. The minority stockholders attacked the
proposed rate of exchange. The court held that Bourns, being
on both sides of the transaction, had the burden of proving
intrinsic fairness. 189 Similarly, in David J. Greene & Co. v.
Dunhill International, Inc.,190 the court held that the party
that "stands upon both sides of the proposed merger,. . . (a)
has the burden of proof, (b) to show that the transaction is
fair, (c) after a careful scrutiny by the Court." 1 '
184 380 A.2d at 980.
"s 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952). For a discussion of the fairness cases prior to Singer,
see McBride, supra note 118, at 2250-53; McClure, supra note 29, at 918; Freezeout
Mergers, supra note 6, at 229-32; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 699-701;
Note, supra note 119, at 719-22; Note, supra note 30, at 925-28.
1' 93 A.2d at 109.
187 Id. at 110.
18 256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969).
188 Id. at 681.
1 0 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
191 Id. at 431.
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Another line of cases, however, did not apply the intrinsic
fairness test, holding instead that appraisal was the sole rem-
edy for a dissenting stockholder. In Bruce v. E. L. Bruce Co.
192
the minority shareholders of the subsidiary sought to enjoin a
planned merger with the parent corporation. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the exchange ratio was an undervaluation of their
stock.193 The court, much to the minority's chagrin, held that
statutory appraisal was their sole remedy because:
[A]bsent fraud or a showing that the terms of a proposed
merger are so unfair as to shock the conscience of the court
it is the policy of the courts of Delaware to permit con-
tracting corporations to take advantage of statutory devices
for corporate consolidation furnished by legislative act....
Judicial interference is inappropriate in most instances of
merger because an efficient and fair method has been pro-
vided which permits judicially protected withdrawal by
stockholders from a proposed consolidation.1
The Delaware Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in
Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., discussed supra, holding
therein that appraisal was the sole and exclusive remedy in a
short form cash out merger situation. 95
The court was confronted with these two conflicting lines
of authority when it next dealt with freezeout mergers in
Singer."" The court opted for an attempt at controlling
freezeouts, adopted the Sterling viewpoint, and required a
fairness hearing to justify the terms of a merger. 197 The court
also stated specifically that the majority stockholders could
not satisfy their fiduciary duty merely by relegating the mi-
nority to statutory appraisal. 9 8
At least part of the reason for abandoning appraisal as
the exclusive remedy rests with the shortcomings of the ap-
praisal process itself. 99 The statutes require that the dissent-
192 174 A.2d 29 (Del. Ch. 1961).
193 Id. at 30.
194 Id.
19- 187 A.2d 79, 80 (Del. 1962).
1" McBride, supra note 118, at 2250-53.
197 380 A.2d at 976.
19I Id. at 977.
19 Najjar suggested some of the problems with the appraisal remedy: 1) it is
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ing stockholder follow certain specific procedures, 20 0 and the
cases require strict and technical compliance with those pro-
cedures.20 1 Furthermore, the recovery of the appraisal remedy
is reduced by attorneys' and appraisers' fees. 202 The most dif-
ficult problems with the appraisal remedy, however, arise
from the inadequacy of the valuation process. Timing is com-
pletely controlled by the majority. Thus, the dissenting stock-
holder may suffer inopportune tax consequences.2 0s Further-
more, the merger frequently occurs when the corporation is on
the verge of significant growth or profit which has not yet
manifested itself in the market.204 The appraising court values
the stock as of the time of the merger, thus failing to account
for any appreciation in stock value caused by the impending
merger or prospective earnings of the corporation.20 5 There-
fore, the dissenting stockholder generally is not given a value
for his stock which reflects an arm's length bargain, and there
is no assurance of fairness.
°2 0
Although the fairness hearing could be construed as a
substitute for the appraisal remedy, the cases are unclear
about this. The Tanzer court held that a fairness hearing
which concentrated solely on the price offered for the stock
was overly restrictive and that the fairness hearing requires a
court to scrutinize "all aspects of the transaction.1
207
Commentators have been more helpful in describing a
fairness hearing. Generally, it is conceived as a broad balanc-
ing of the factors involved in the freezeout merger. 208 It is gen-
based upon the status of the market; 2) it is based upon the elements of an appraisal;
and 3) the timing of the appraisal is in the control of the majority. 407 A.2d at 1034.
200 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1978).
201 E.g., Carl Marks & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 233 A.2d 63 (Del.
1967); Shaffer v. General Grain, Inc., 182 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. App. 1962); Acree v.
E.I.F.C., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1973).
202 F. O'NWL, supra note 1, at 332 (1975); Greene, supra note 22, at 503; Lynch,
supra note 74, at 53-57; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 698-99.
20 F. O'NEAL, supra note 1, at 334 (1975); Lynch, supra note 74, at 53-57; Vor-
enberg, supra note 4, at 1200-05; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 697-99.
204 Lynch, supra note 74, at 53-57.
205 Id.; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 698.
020 Comment, supra note 6, at 809.
207 379 A.2d at 1125.
208 See Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 236; Corporate Freezeouts, supra
note 5, at 707.
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erally seen as a vehicle by which the court can properly exer-
cise its equitable powers, allowing, as it does, scrutiny of all
the facts unique to each case.20 9 There are a number of factors
to be considered, among them, the existence of any coercive-
ness or overreaching by the majority, the condition of the
market and the timing of the transaction, the presence or ab-
sence of any selfdealing by the majority, and any relevant tax
consequences. 210 It is clear, however, that the two most impor-
tant factors will still be the adequacy of the business purpose
and the price.
The importance of the business purpose is reflected in
terms of whether that purpose can be satisfied short of freez-
ing out the minority.211 This issue reveals the defects in the
business purpose test which have already been discussed, i.e.,
whether the focus should be on the merger or the cash out
phase.212 Another concern is just what impact the business
purpose should have in the fairness hearing. On the one hand,
it may be considered a threshold issue which, if found to exist,
proves the absence of intrinsic unfairness. The burden of
proof would then be shifted to the minority stockholders.2 3
On the other hand, it may be considered just one of many
factors.21 The courts should be careful not to put undue em-
phasis on business purpose.1 5 Clearly, since the fairness issue
invokes the equity powers of the court, overemphasis of strict
standards and pigeonholes should be avoided.21 ' The flex-
ibility of the equity courts must be maintained in order to
deal with the unique and varying fact patterns that arise in
the going private context.
The adequacy of the price is clearly the single most im-
portant issue, especially in the going private context. The in-
terest of the public stockholder lies only in the value of his
109 Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 236.
210 Id.; Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 707.
211 See Comment, supra note 54, at 132-33.
212 See notes 161-82 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
212 Comment, supra note 54, at 132-33.
21, Corporate Freezeouts, supra note 5, at 707.
215 Id.
216 Roland v. Najjar, 407 A.2d at 1038 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
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investment.2117 Most commentators argue that consideration of
the fairness of the price should move away from the appraisal-
type approach. This movement should be toward a formula
which gives the minority stockholder some recognition of the
future prosperity of the corporation which he is being forced
to leave.218 The fairness of the price should be determined by
the arm's length bargain standard.21 9 The value of the stock
should not depend solely on pre-merger indicia (such as mar-
ket price, past earnings, and dividend records) but should also
consider the value of the corporation as a going concern, the,
value of the stock as affected by the pending merger, and the
potential for future earnings. 220 An evaluation of this type is
more consistent with the realistic expectations of public stock-
holders regarding the value and the nature of their interest in
the stock.
4. An Overview of the State Law Approach
The requirement of a fairness hearing is the most reason-
able upshot of the Singer line of cases, proposing as it does to
look at each going private transaction in terms of the relevant
facts involved. By the same token, the fairness hearing, as
herein interpreted, does no more than describe the traditional
functions of a court of equity. This conception of the fairness
test minimizes the impact of a separate business purpose test
with its attendant problems. Moreover, this approach also
provides the flexibility of relief found lacking by the dissenter
in Najjar.
22 1
21? See Freezeout Mergers, supra note 6, at 235-36.
218 Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 548, 575-77 (1978); Business Purpose Test, supra note 133, at 1216-
17; Rights of Minority Shareholders, supra note 5, at 1000-01; Comment, supra note
6, at 809-10.
:9 Comment, supra note 6, at 809.
20 Toms, supra note 218, at 575-77; Business Purpose Test, supra note 133, at
1216-17; Rights of Minority Shareholders, supra note 5, at 1000-01; Comment, supra
note 6, at 809-10.
221 407 A.2d at 1038 (Quilen, J., dissenting).
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HI. THE FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION
Federal participation in going private law has been incon-
sistent and varied. After some decisions of the Second Circuit
promised to provide a basis for extensive federal intervention
in the area,222 the Supreme Court decided Green v. Santa Fe
Industries, Inc., 23 an opinion which put severe limits on the
Second Circuit approach. As a result, recent federal develop-
ments represent the first steps toward renewed involvement.
A. The Background of the Federal Approach
Federal securities law is generally adequate to control a
going private merger where there are material misstatements
or omissions or where actual fraud surrounds the transac-
tion.2 The courts attempted to broaden established securi-
ties law concepts so as to cover going private transactions
even where there were no material misleading statements
made nor deception practiced by those in control of the corpo-
ration. The two cases which initiated this movement were the
Second Circuit decisions in Green v. Santa Fe Industries,
Inc.225 and Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.22 6
The Green case involved a short form merger under Dela-
ware law in which the minority stockholders of Kirby Lumber
Corporation were cashed out. The plaintiffs, minority stock-
holders, sued under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5 to enjoin the merger, claiming the
merger was a scheme to defraud them. The primary grievance
of the plaintiffs was that their stock was grossly undervalued,
as opposed to any claim of misrepresentation in the proxy
materials.227 Despite the absence of deceptive conduct, the
court found:
222 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
223 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
224 F. O'NWAL, supra note 1, at 63-64 discusses freezeout mergers dealing with
misstatements and omissions in proxy materials.
220 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
226 533 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 881 (1976).
227 533 F.2d at 1285-89.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
[T]hat a complaint alleges a claim under Rule 10b-5 when it
charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form merger,
that the majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary
duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting
the merger without any justifiable business purpose.228
Marshel involved a similar situation. Therein the plain-
tiffs, minority stockholders in Concord Fabrics, Inc., sought to
enjoin a merger between Concord and AFW Fabric Corp.
Again the basis for the claim was section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
The plaintiffs alleged that the sole purpose of the merger was
to make Concord private by cashing out the public stockhold-
ers. The defense was that there were no deceptive statements
made and that the state merger law was strictly followed.220
The court held that rule 10b-5 applied despite the absence of
deceptive statements, stating in the course of its opinion:
In the present case the "merger" itself constitutes a fraudu-
lent scheme because it represents an attempt by the major-
ity stockholders to utilize corporate funds for strictly per-
sonal benefit. Under these circumstances it would surely be
anomalous to hold that a cause of action is stated under
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the fraudulent conduct in con-
nection with a purchase or sale of securities includes decep-
tion but that similarly fraudulent practices carried out with
prior disclosures to the helpless victim do not give rise to a
Rule 10b-5 claim.2 1
The final word, however, came from the Supreme Court
in Green. The Supreme Court saw the determining factor as
whether a material misrepresentation was made or whether
there was a material failure to disclose.231 The Court held that
a violation of rule 10b-5 occurred only if the conduct com-
plained of was manipulative or deceptive within the meaning
of the statute.232 The activity was found not deceptive because
it did not involve a material non-disclosure.2 33 Furthermore,
228 Id. at 1291.
229 533 F.2d at 1278-80.
2s0 Id. at 1282.
221 430 U.S. at 473-74.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 474-76.
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there was no manipulation since that term "refers generally to
practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices,
that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting
market activity. '23 4 As a result, the holding was that absent
an allegation of misstatement or omission, no cause of action
was stated under federal law.235 Thus, the Supreme Court put
an end to any realistic possibility of using rule 10b-5 and sec-
tion 10(b) to attack a going private transaction.
B. New Rule 13e-3: The Beginnings of a New Federal
Approach
The Supreme Court in Green reserved decision on
whether the SEC had authority to promulgate rules under
other sections of the securities acts respecting going private
transactions.2 6 Both before and after Green, the SEC pro-
posed various rules to deal with going private transactions.3
On August 8, 1979, the SEC released rule 13e-3 238 and accom-
panying schedule 13e-3 2 3' as a first step in dealing with going
private transactions under the securities laws. This rule was
much the same as the proposal released for comment in
1977.240
1. The General Approach of the New Rule
The purpose of the new rule is:
[t]o augment and implement the present statutory provi-
sions by prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative
23 Id. at 476.
235 Id. at 473-74.
.' Id. at 473 n.12.
23 See 42 Fed. Reg. 60090 (1977) for a list of the SEC releases which deal with
the going private rule-making process. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note
35, at 471-81, regarding the 1977 proposed version of rule 13e-3.
1" 44 Fed. Reg. 46741 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3).
23 44 Fed. Reg. 46743 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100).
' Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 46736-43 (1979) with 42 Fed. Reg. 60100-02 (1977).
The new rule as finally adopted closely parallels the proposal in terms of both its
coverage and its requirements. While most of the changes that have been made are
relatively minor, the new rule does provide certain exceptions to its coverage which
were not included in the proposal. 44 Fed. Reg. at 46743, rule 13e-3(g)(1)-(2). These
two additional exceptions are discussed in 44 Fed. Reg. at 46738.
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acts or practices in connection with going private transac-
tions and by prescribing new filing, disclosure and dissemi-
nation requirements as a means reasonably designed to pre-
vent such acts and practices.
2 41
More specifically, the rule is meant to ensure full disclosure in
any transaction which may have the effect of delisting a class
of securities from a national exchange or suspending registra-
tion under the Securities Exchange Act.242  The rule is not
intended to cover transactions which will not lead to these
results.
On the other hand, the SEC has not attempted to estab-
lish any substantive controls over going private transactions
by enacting this rule.243 This lack is due not only to an in-
crease in available state remedies, the result of Singer and
progeny, but also exists because the SEC staff is inexperi-
enced in making decisions regarding the fairness of going pri-
vate transactions.244 The deferral to state court remedies may
last only until the effectiveness of the disclosure requirements
can be determined.245
2. The Scope of Rule 13e-3
The actual mechanics of rule 13e-3 are explained in detail
in the SEC releases concerning the rule.246 There are, how-
ever, certain points which merit discussion concerning going
private transactions. One such point is the scope of the rule,
241 44 Fed. Reg. 46736 (1979).
22 Id. at 46741, rule 13e-3(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(B) (to be codified in C.F.R. § 240.13e-3).
243 44 Fed. Reg. 46736 (1979). This is one distinction between the 1979 version of
the rule and the version proposed in 1977: 42 Fed. Reg. 60090, 60100 (1977). See also
42 Fed. Reg. at 60096; 1 M. Ln-roN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 35, at 472-73.
244 See 44 Fed. Reg. at 46736, wherein it is noted: 1) that the Commission will
avoid making any judgments concerning the fairness of individual transactions until
the effectiveness of the new rule can be determined; and 2) that further developments
in available state court remedies may obviate the necessity of the Comm*[ion-lever
making such judgments. But see 44 Fed. Reg. 46743, 46745, schedule .13e-3, item 8,
which requires the issuer or affiliate filing pursuant to schedule 13e-3 to state whether
it is reasonably believed that the transaction is fair vel non to unaffiliated security
holders. Supporting data must be filed along with the issuer or affiliate's opinion. A
discussion of this filing requirement is contained in 44 Fed. Reg. at 46740.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 46737-41.
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i.e., the types of transactions that are within its coverage. 247
There are basically three requirements which must be
met if a transaction is to come within the rule. It must fit
within the definition of a rule 13e-3 transaction; it must not
fit into a listed exception to the rule; and the securities must
be of a class which requires registration under section 12 or
periodic reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act.
248
To be a 13e-3 transaction, the conduct must involve cer-
tain listed transactions2 49 and lead to certain listed results.
250
The transactions cover virtually all of the important going pri-
vate devices. Included are tender offers2e ' and all purchases of
securities by the issuer pursuant to "any acquisition subject to
the control of an issuer,"25 2 including, inter alia, mergers and
reverse stock splits,253 as well as solicitation of proxies and
distributions of information in connection with corporate re-
organizations, such as mergers or reclassifications.
2 54
It is the effects which must flow from these transactions
that serve as the primary limitation on the applicability of the
rule. If, prior to the transaction, the class of securities in-
volved is held of record by more than 300 persons; listed on a
national exchange; or quoted in an inter-dealer quotation sys-
tem (therefore subject to section 12 or 15(d)), and, following
the exchange, is no longer in one of these categories, the
transaction is within the rule.2 5 If these effects do not flow
from the transaction, it is outside of rule 13e-3. By so limiting
the rule, the SEC has effectively focused on the specific
247 The rule also outlines the disclosure and dissemination requirements which
apply if the transaction is a rule 13e-3 transaction. 44 Fed. Reg. at 46742, rule 13e-
3(d), (f); 44 Fed Reg. at 46743, schedule 13E-3. However, for the purposes of this
Note it is important only that the approach of the rule is one of disclosure; the details
of that disclosure are irrelevant. The primary concern of this Note, given the disclo-
sure approach, is the type of transactions which are covered.
248 44 Fed. Reg. at 46737.
249 Id. at 46741, rule 13e-3(a)(4)(i).
290 Id., rule 13e-3(a)(4)(ii).
222 Id., rule 13e-3(a)(4)(i)(B).
252 Id., rule 13e-3(a)(3)(iv).
213 Id., rule 13e-3(a)(3)(ii)-(iii).
214 Id., rule 13e-3(a)(4)(i)(C).
225 Id., rule 13e-3(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(B).
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problems of the minority stockholder, such as loss of the mar-
ketability of his stock and loss of the shares themselves with-
out fair remuneration.
The rule also provides exceptions to its applications,
structured around those situations which have been shown by
experience to involve no substantial unfairness to or over-
reaching of public stockholders. 56 These exclusions cover
tender offers and subsequent cash out mergers by an outsider
of the target corporation, provided the plan is disclosed in ad-
vance and is consummated within a specified period of
time.257 In addition, share-for-share exhanges are excluded,
provided the terms of both securities are substantially the
same.258 These, and the other available exclusions, help to
maintain the flexibility of corporate activities and protect le-
gitimate corporate reorganizations from the burdens of disclo-
sure. This protection extends to corporate activities which are
technically 13e-3 transactions but which, by their nature, ap-
proach the ideal of an arm's length bargain.
CONCLUSION
The problem created by going private mergers and by go-
ing private transactions in general is one of grave concern if
confidence in the securities markets is to be maintained and
the value of the public stockholders investment is to be pro-
tected. By the same token, control of such transactions cannot
be based on ambiguous and overbroad standards which
threaten to hinder corporate flexibility in legitimate activities.
The state law approach typified by the Singer line of
cases, while a valuable first step in dealing with going private,
is severely overdependent on traditional corporate law princi-
ples which are inappropriate in the going private context. As a
consequence, it is limited in its flexibility. At present, the
state law approach cannot provide appropriate remedies in all
cases and still maintain the integrity of the statutory powers
which exist in favor of the corporation. The state approach
51 44 Fed. Reg. at 46738.
257 Id. at 46743, rule 13e-3(g)(1).
218 Id., rule 13e-3(g)(2).
[Vol. 69
FAIRNESS IN FREEZEOUTS
should be keyed more toward the realistic nature of public
stock ownership and less toward an outdated vested rights
outlook.
The effectiveness of the federal approach embodied in
rule 13e-3 has not yet been determined. Ultimately its chief
contribution may be to discourage those corporations with
marginal reasons for going private from doing so in the first
place. 2519 The federal rule is more in tune with reality in that it
excludes from its coverage transactions which do not contain
the potential for abuse. The federal concept of fairness, how-
ever, remains linked to the concepts of business purpose and
fairness contained in the state approach.
At best, both approaches are but steps in the evolution of
effective going private law. They each leave significant prob-
lem areas to be explored and resolved. They have yet to deal
with the issue of state-federal interaction in the area, an issue
raised by the Supreme Court in Green. The only thing that
may be said with confidence is that, despite all the commen-
tary, the last word has not been uttered.
James Robert Lyons, Jr.
21, Many corporations that first went public in the years 1968-1972 did so ill-
advisedly and should have sought funds from private sources. As a result, when the
securities market fell in 1974, these corporations no longer obtained benefits by being
public, yet were saddled with the corresponding burdens. Comment, supra note 5, at
1430-32.
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